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The management of vertical relationships is one of the fundamental issues addressed by con-
tract and organization theorists. How should suppliers and retailers design contracts? What
are the consequences if suppliers forward integrate? How do choices about contracts and
organizational form interact with other strategic choices? The answers to these questions
inform management strategy and public policy. This paper provides insight into vertical
relationships by analyzing relationships between movie distributors (studios or independent
distributors) and exhibitors (theaters). Vertical integration in the movie industry is partic-
ularly interesting because the Paramount decrees of the late 1940s and early 1950s barred
studios from owning theaters. Then in the 1980s the U.S. Department of Justice gave studios
permission to forward integrate into exhibition again (De Vany and Eckert 1991). Several
distributors did so, including some of the largest ones.
This paper introduces an inﬁnite-horizon common agency model with two distributors
and one exhibitor where distributors can invest each period before contracting with the
exhibitor, who owns a theater with multiple screens. A distributor’s investment stochastically
improves the movies it holds in inventory; the probability of having “hits” as opposed to
“ﬂops” rises. Vertical integration occurs when one distributor owns the exhibitor.
Static common agency models have been analyzed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and
many others but authors have only recently begun to explore dynamic models (Bergemann
and Valimaki 1998, Prat and Rustichini 1998). Bergemann and Valimaki (1998) provide
results for inﬁnite-horizon models. They show that the Bernheim-Whinston marginal con-
tribution equilibrium (where principal i’s value each period is the diﬀerence between the
value all players can generate and the value the others can generate by contracting with-
out i in the period and playing optimally thereafter) is eﬃcient in the sense of maximizing
the joint value of the players. However, Bergemann and Valimaki (1998) do not consider
investment or vertical integration.
I begin by providing intuition using a two-period model where distributors invest in
period one and contract with the exhibitor in period two. I compare three settings: a
monopolist who owns all three ﬁrms, two independent distributors who receive their marginal
2contributions, and vertical integration where the independent distributor receives a portion
of its marginal contribution that depends on its bargaining power. For the inﬁnite-horizon
model, computational results show how strategies and welfare vary across these settings.
The inﬁnite-horizon model explains several facts about movie distribution.1 Distributors
avoid simultaneous new hit releases, and hits stay in the theater longer than ﬂops. In reality,
release timing and run lengths are critical choices. Distributors often adjust release dates to
avoid competing head-to-head (Reardon 1992, Krider and Weinberg 1998, Chisholm 1999)
and run lengths depend on early performance (De Vany and Eckert 1991,D eV a n ya n dW a l l s
1996). Further, in the marginal contribution equilibrium distributors appropriate the lion’s
share of the marginal value created by their hits. This occurs because hits are rare and the
exhibitor’s next best alternative is to show worse movies. This is consistent with real-world
exhibition contracts, which use non-linear revenue sharing rules that give distributors higher
shares of ticket revenue when revenue is high (Filson et al. 2002).
Non-integration yields the same choices and welfare as monopoly. Thus, as in Bergemann
and Valimaki (1998), non-integration is eﬃcient in the sense of maximizing ﬁrm value. If
investment is suﬃciently costly, investment never occurs and vertical integration yields the
same choices and welfare as monopoly. Otherwise, vertical integration is privately proﬁtable
but lowers industry proﬁts: the combined value of the two ﬁrms that merge rises because
they appropriate value from the remaining distributor, but sub-optimal investment occurs
so the combined value of all three ﬁrms falls.
Additional results depend on how integration aﬀects the bargaining power of the indepen-
dent distributor. Suppose that the independent distributor maintains its bargaining power
after integration and continues to receive its marginal contribution. In this case, integration
causes the integrated distributor to increase its investment and delay releasing its hits. The
integrated distributor uses its hits as threats to appropriate value from the independent dis-
tributor. In response, the independent distributor reduces its investment. However, total
1Other authors provide complementary explanations for various features of movie exhibition contracts
and distribution arrangements. De Vany and Eckert (1991) and De Vany and Walls (1996) emphasize that
diﬃculties with forecasting demand necessitate the use of short-term contingency-rich contracts. Filson et
al. (2002) show how revenue sharing allows distributors to share risk with exhibitors. Corts (2001)c o n s i d e r s
how vertical structures aﬀect release date scheduling. Kenney and Klein (1983) and Hanssen (2000) analyze
block booking. Borcherding and Filson (2001) review the literature on contracts in the movie business.
3industry investment never falls, and it rises for a wide range of investment costs. Higher
industry investment causes more hits to reach the theater, and consumer surplus rises. As
a result, integration may improve welfare. Beginning from a high cost of investment, the
welfare comparison favors integration more as the cost of investing falls. However, when the
cost of investing is suﬃciently low, industry investment is already high in the non-integrated
setting and does not increase when integration occurs. In this case, integration has no im-
pact on industry value or consumer surplus and thus is welfare neutral (although it is still
privately proﬁtable).
Now suppose that the independent distributor loses all of its bargaining power after
integration and gives its entire marginal contribution to the integrated ﬁrm. In this case, in-
tegration causes the independent distributor to reduce its investment to zero. The integrated
distributor still increases its investment, but industry investment falls. Lower industry invest-
ment causes fewer hits to reach the theater than in the non-integrated setting, and welfare
unambiguously falls. Other strategies also change. The integrated distributor does not need
to delay releasing its hits in order to appropriate value from the independent distributor. As
a result, it tends to show its own new hits in preference to the independent distributor’s. In
cases between these two extremes (where the distributors share the independent distributor’s
marginal contribution) the welfare eﬀects are between these two extremes, and the critical
level of consumer surplus per ticket required for integration to improve welfare rises.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on vertical relationships. In this liter-
ature, most of the emphasis is on exclusive dealing. Recent papers along this line include
Martimort (1996) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998). In other related literature, Aghion
and Bolton (1987) analyze how an incumbent seller facing a threat of entry can sign a long-
term contract with a buyer to attempt to deter entry, and O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1997) and
Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) analyze how multiple principals can use non-exclusive contracts
to provide incentives to a common agent. The results here on the eﬀects of vertical integra-
tion on investment and welfare are similar to those obtained by Bolton and Whinston (1993)
in a model of supply assurance with multiple downstream ﬁrms. This paper contributes to
the literature by combining contract choice with investment and other strategic choices and
considering dynamic competition, which allows for richer strategic interaction.
42. The Multiplex
The multiplex (a theater with multiple screens) provides a simple environment with multiple
upstream ﬁrms and a single downstream ﬁrm. A Multiplex deals with multiple distributors,
and competing multiplexes are typically located far away.2 Consider a simple model of
movie allocation in a multiplex based on Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1998). There are
two distributors, D1 and D2, and one exhibitor EX. Each distributor has two movies: D1
has 1aa n d1b and D2 has 2a and 2b. EX has a single theater with two auditoriums, so it
can show only two of the four movies. Both auditoriums are identical. If a monopolist owns
D1, D2, and EX, it chooses an allocation of movies to auditoriums to maximize total proﬁt.
Denote the resulting total proﬁtb yπall.
Now suppose that D1 and D2 are independent from EX. Each distributor submits six
bids, one for every possible allocation ({1a,2a}, {1a,1b}, {1a,2b}, {2a,1b}, {2a,2b}, and
{1b,2b}). Then EX chooses the allocation that maximizes the total bid. A distributor can
attempt to avoid undesirable pairings by conditioning its bid for a movie on which other
movie its movie will be paired with. Following Bernheim and Whinston (1998), focus on
subgame perfect Nash equilibria that are Pareto-undominated (within the set of equilibria)
for the distributors. The equilibrium allocation of movies to auditoriums maximizes total
proﬁt and payoﬀso fe a c hp l a y e ra r e :
D1: πall − π2
D2: πall − π1
EX : π1 + π2 − πall
where π1 is the proﬁtD 1 and EX could obtain by showing only D1’s movies and π2 is deﬁned
similarly. Each distributor receives its marginal contribution to πall. In order for this to be
a proper equilibrium EX’s payoﬀ must be positive; otherwise EX would refuse to show any
2Several reasons for constructing multiplexes are not explored here. Multiplexes absorb idiosyncratic
demand shocks better because negative shocks on one movie can be balanced against positive shocks on
others. Reallocating movies to auditoriums of diﬀerent sizes occurs as demand is observed. Showing times
are staggered to keep staﬀ and other inputs continuously employed. Multiplexes are pervasive. The Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) reports that domestically in 2001 there were 7,070 theaters; 2,280
single screens, 2,901 two to seven screens, 1,458 eight to ﬁfteen screens, and 431 sixteen or more screens.
5movies and obtain a payoﬀ of 0. The distributors’ payoﬀs are always positive because πall
must be at least as large as π1 and π2.
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that the equilibrium allocation can be implemented
by making EX the residual claimant. Each distributor receives a ﬁxed fee from EX equal to
its equilibrium payoﬀ, and EX chooses the two movies that maximize proﬁt. Proﬁtm a x i -
mization is roughly equivalent to revenue maximization because when a movie is placed in the
theater most of the distributor’s costs are sunk and most of the exhibitor’s costs are ﬁxed.
Thus, the model suggests one explanation for why real-world exhibition contracts involve
revenue sharing: the contracts encourage exhibitors to consider cross eﬀects on demand.3
The inﬁnite-horizon model does not allow this interpretation of the marginal contribution
equilibrium because future values must be considered as well as current revenue. However,
as discussed below, the distribution of payoﬀsi nt h ei n ﬁnite-horizon model roughly matches
that of real-world exhibition contracts.
Now suppose that D2 owns EX and that D1 receives some fraction of its marginal contri-
bution that depends on its bargaining power. If we continue to focus on Pareto-undominated
equilibria, the equilibrium allocation continues to maximize total proﬁta n dp a y o ﬀsa r e :
D1: α(πall − π2)
D2: π2 +( 1− α)(πall − π2)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Note that in every setting the allocation is eﬃcient in the sense of maximizing total
proﬁt. Thus, a welfare comparison across monopoly, non-integration, and integration yields
no diﬀerences. However, the distribution of proﬁt changes. Because of this, introducing
investment decisions that precede the allocation of movies to auditoriums yields diﬀerences
across the settings. Consider a two-period game where D1 and D2 can invest in improving
their movies in period 1 before playing the “allocation game” in period 2. Suppose that
investing in a movie increases the proﬁt that can be obtained from it but that the amount
of the increase may depend on which other movie it is paired with.
3De Vany and Eckert (1991) and Filson et al. (2001) note that revenue sharing evolved prior to multiplexes
becoming wide-spread. Therefore, there are clearly other reasons for revenue sharing, such as risk sharing.
6Consider subgame perfect equilibria: in period 1 the distributors look ahead, realize what
their payoﬀs will be in the allocation game, and choose their investments accordingly. If a
monopolist owns D1 and D2, it maximizes πall net of the cost of investment. In this sense,
investment is eﬃcient. If D1 and D2 are both independent, they still tend to make eﬃcient
i n v e s t m e n t sa sl o n ga st h e yc a n n o ta ﬀect each other’s movies. For example, D1 looks ahead
and knows that its payoﬀ in the allocation game will be πall − π2. If D1 cannot aﬀect π2
(because π2 depends only on D2’s movies), then D1 invests if and only if doing so improves
πall net of the cost of investment. There is a potential coordination problem if distributors’
optimal choices are interdependent, but selecting the Pareto-superior equilibrium is enough
to eliminate any diﬀerence between the monopoly and non-integrated settings.
However, under integration the incentives change. Consider two extreme cases. If α =1 ,
D 2i n v e s t sa sl o n ga sd o i n gs oi n c r e a s e sπ2 net of the cost of investment, regardless of the
eﬀect on πall. Thus, D2 may invest too much or too little compared to the eﬃcient level. As
a result, even though D1 has the incentive to maximize πall net of the cost of investment,
industry investment is likely to be ineﬃcient. Alternatively, if α =0 ,D 1 has no incentive
to invest at all. Thus, even though D2 has the incentive to maximize πall net of the cost
of investment, industry investment is likely to be ineﬃcient. Note that if the distributors’
optimal investments are interdependent, then both are likely to depart from the monopoly
choices in these cases, even though one has the incentive to invest eﬃciently. For intermediate
values of α, both distributors may invest ineﬃciently.
The results in this section are not speciﬁc to the movie industry; the “movies” could
be any products. The results provide intuition for the results in the next section, where
I compute a stationary inﬁnite-horizon model. Computing requires specifying additional
structure speciﬁc to the movie industry, but many of the general features hold in other
industries. As in this section, the issue of eﬃciency revolves around the question of whether
investment decisions are eﬃcient; if investments do not diﬀer across settings then eﬃciency
does not diﬀer across settings. Investments and allocations in the non-integrated setting
maximize industry value. However, these investments and allocations may not maximize
consumer surplus, and as a result vertical integration may improve total welfare even though
it lowers industry value.
73. A Stationary Inﬁnite-Horizon Model of the Multiplex
The model in Section 2 has some implications that are at odds with real-world observations.
Multiple hits would be shown simultaneously, because such an allocation would maximize
single-period proﬁt. In reality, release dates of hits are often staggered.4 Krider and Weinberg
(1998) and Chisholm (1999) provide evidence on this, and Reardon (1992), president of
Warner Brothers Distributing Corporation at the time of writing, writes: “Competition is
a crucial issue in targeting a release. Will we be up against a movie with similar audience-
segment appeal? Sometimes this leads to moving dates up or back.” Another fact is that
the length of the theatrical run varies across movies depending on whether they are hits or
ﬂops. Distributor choices about release dates and run lengths interact with their choices of
contract terms and investment. In order to allow for these phenomena I develop a dynamic
version of the model of the multiplex.
In the model, two distributors, D1 and D2, and a single exhibitor with two auditoriums,
EX, interact over an inﬁnite number of periods. Over time, movies are released, play out their
runs, and are replaced with new movies. At the beginning of each period each distributor
has two movies in its inventory: D1 has 1aa n d1b and D2 has 2a and 2b. Each movie is
of one of ﬁve types: new hit, new ﬂop, old hit, old ﬂop, and ﬁnished. New movies have
not been shown in the theater, old movies were shown in the theater in the previous period,
and ﬁnished movies were old in the previous period. The state space is all of the possible
combinations of movie types of the four movies {1a, 1b} and {2a, 2b}. For example, one
state is {new hit, old ﬂop} {ﬁnished, new ﬂop}: D1 has a new hit and an old ﬂop and D2
has a movie that has ﬁnished its run and a new ﬂop.
Each period, before movies are allocated to auditoriums distributors play a “replacement
game,” a simultaneous-move game where each distributor may replace one or both of its
movies with new movies. Each new movie is a hit with probability p and a ﬂop with
probability 1 − p, and all players observe whether each new movie is a hit or a ﬂop as soon
4That this occurs shows that avoiding head-to-head competition is important in the movie business. In
other industries other concerns might dominate. For example, Doyle and Snyder (1999) show that when an
automobile manufacturer announces an increase in production other automobile manufacturers respond by
increasing their production. Announcements reveal private information about common demand parameters;
this eﬀect dominates the desire to avoid head-to-head competition.
8as it is added to inventory.5 Movies that are ﬁnished must be replaced and there is no
cost to doing so.6 Movies that are new or old can be replaced by paying a cost c.T h i s
decision is an investment of the type described in Section 2; ﬂops may be replaced early in
an attempt to obtain hits. The assumption that replacing movies before they are ﬁnished
is costly reﬂects the fact that production schedules are set years in advance along with
tentative release windows, and it is costly to alter the schedule or obtain additional movies
for distribution. This investment decision has alternative interpretations. Essentially, by
paying c a distributor has a chance of improving the movie types held in inventory.7
The replacement game can be depicted using a simple payoﬀ matrix. For example,
Figure 1 describes the replacement game for the non-integrated setting when the state at
the beginning of the period is {new hit, old ﬂop} {ﬁnished, new ﬂop}. Since D2 must replace
its ﬁnished movie, its only choice is whether to replace 2b or not. D1 can replace neither of its
movies, one or the other, or both. The W1
i,,j,W2
i,j,We
i.j terms represent each player’s expected
value associated with each possible pair of strategies, where the superscripts index the player
and the subscripts index which movies are replaced. Note that in the non-integrated setting,
5Note that a movie’s type is not observed until the distributor adds it to inventory. This keeps the state
space manageable because the only state variables are the types of movies held in inventory rather than all
those in production. Evidence suggests the assumption is reasonable. De Vany and Walls (1996, 1999) show
that the distribution of cumulative box oﬃce revenues has an inﬁnite variance. Thus, forecasting is impossible
without movie-speciﬁc information, and when the production schedule is set there is very little movie-speciﬁc
information available (at best, the script and main actors are known). Chisholm (1999) asserts that pre-
production information is suﬃcient for studios to plan to release hits around holiday weekends. While this
happens, studio forecasts are often wrong (see Borcherding and Filson 2001 and the sources cited there).
Some of the most successful movies in history were initially turned down by studios, including Star Wars
and Titanic, and big bets have been made on ﬂops, too, like Howard the Duck and Ishtar.T h u s ,a s s u m i n g
that pre-production forecasting is impossible is reasonable. Once a movie has been made, pre-release surveys
yield signals of its potential. Even then errors are possible; the signals are noisy. Allowing for noisy public
signals of new movie types instead of perfect observation of types does not aﬀect the conclusions below.
6This implies that a movie can be in the theater at most two periods and these periods must be consecutive.
This captures the main features of real-world runs: when a movie is released an initial contract is signed
for a four to eight week run and there is an option for extending the run. In the model new contracts are
negotiated each period, whereas real-world contracts may include holdover clauses that achieve the same
result: hit movies are kept in the theater longer. Holdover clauses reduce transaction costs by removing the
need for new negotiations.
7For example, it is possible to model investment as an advertising or promotional expenditure that can
improve a movie’s type. For convenience and to minimize notation, I assume that spending c allows a
distributor to draw a new movie at random. Slight variations in this assumption, such as allowing for a
diﬀerent value of p to apply for these cases, or allowing the “replacement” to occur only if the new movie is
better than the existing one (which matters only if the existing movie is an old hit), or assuming that c is
not movie speciﬁc (the movies to be replaced are chosen only after the new movies’ types are revealed) do
not change the conclusions. I discuss these and other variations of the model in Subsection 3.7.
9EX is a passive player in the replacement game. Its value is aﬀected by the decisions but it
has no role in making the decisions.
Suppose that the Nash equilibrium8 of the game in Figure 1 is unique and that in equi-
librium D1 replaces its old ﬂop and D2 replaces only its ﬁnished movie.9 Then the expected
values of each distributor are given by W1
b,a and W2
b,a. A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1,g i v e nt h e
choices the distributors make, the state that results from the replacement game is randomly
determined because it depends on the probability that each newly drawn movie is a hit.
After the replacement game is over all players observe each new movie’s type. Then the
players play the “allocation game.” Clearly, a monopolist allocates movies to maximize the
total value. I consider each other setting in turn.
3.1. Non-Integration
In the allocation game with two independent distributors, each distributor submits six allo-
cation bids, one for each possible allocation {1a,2a}, {1a,1b}, {1a,2b}, {2a,1b}, {2a,2b}, and
{1b,2b}.10 EX then chooses the allocation to maximize its value, which takes into account
the current bids and EX’s discounted expected future value.
The equilibrium of the allocation game is Markov perfect - each player makes its choices
to maximize its value given the choices of the other players, and choices depend only on the
current state. As in Section 2, I focus on equilibria that are Pareto-undominated (within
the set of equilibria) for the distributors. Given this, the equilibrium of the allocation game
is similar to that described by Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1998) for static games and
Bergemann and Valimaki (1998) for dynamic games: 1) The allocation maximizes the sum
of the players’ expected values; and 2) Each distributor receives the value of its contribution
as its payoﬀ. For example, D1’s expected value is the total expected value minus the total
8By assumption, choices depend only on the current state, so this Nash equilibrium is Markov perfect.
9In general, it is possible that the replacement game has multiple equilibria, in which case any Pareto
dominated equilibria are eliminated and each remaining equilibrium is selected with equal probability. It
is also possible that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. Dealing with this latter possibility proved to be
unecessary because in every case a pure strategy equilibrium existed.
10Thus, as in Section 2 each distributor can condition its bid for a movie on which other movie its movie will
be paired with. In reality, contracts do not do this explicitly. However, two features of real-world contracting
may produce this eﬀect. First, because exhibition contracts are typically the result of negotiations, there
may be some scope for conditioning payments on the exhibitor’s other choices. Second, because real-world
contracts use revenue sharing, the exhibitor has an incentive to avoid pairings with undesirable cross eﬀects.
10expected value that D2 and EX could generate if only D2’s movies were shown in the theater
in the current period.
To continue the example, suppose that each new movie drawn in the replacement game is
a ﬂop. Then at the beginning of the allocation game the state is {new hit, new ﬂop, new ﬂop,
new ﬂop}. Suppose that the allocation that maximizes the total expected value includes 1a
(the new hit) and either 2a or 2b. Denote the total expected value this allocation generates
by V
all, the expected value D1 and EX can generate if only D1’s movies are shown in the
current period and all players play optimally thereafter by V
1e, and the expected value D2
and EX can generate if only D2’s movies are shown in the current period and all players
play optimally thereafter by V
2e. Then
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Appendix A describes explicit formulas for V
all, V
1e, and V
2e.11 To minimize notation, I
use the notation V
all, V
1e, and V
2e in the following subsection where I consider vertical




2e diﬀer there. Under integration with diﬀerent levels of bargaining power,
equilibrium investment changes. As a result, the value functions of every player change.
This makes it diﬃcult to obtain analytical results when comparing the various settings. As
a result, I describe numerical results for a variety of parameter values.
11I assume that EX must show two movies each period. This can be rationalized by assuming that if EX
shows no movies or only one, it loses substantial customer goodwill and incurs a large cost as a result. This
assumption is reasonable in the context of the movie business, where a contracting period is typically four
to eight weeks in length, and no exhibitor could credibly threaten to leave auditoriums empty for that long.
However, as a matter of theory it would be desirable to explore the properties of an equilibrium where the
exhibitor could show less than two movies, perhaps in an attempt to inﬂuence replacement decisions the
following period. I discuss this possibility in Subsection 3.7.
113.2. Vertical Integration
Suppose D2 owns EX and the two units operate as one.12 Timing remains the same: each
period both distributors make replacement decisions simultaneously, then new movies’ types
are observed, and then D1 c o n t r a c t sw i t hD 2a n dD 2c h o o s e sw h i c ht w om o v i e st os h o wi n
the theater. I consider three cases. First, suppose that D1 has suﬃcient bargaining power
to obtain its marginal contribution. Expression (3.1) changes as follows:
W




2(new hit, new ﬂop, new ﬂop, new ﬂop)=V
2e
Expression (3.2) implies that D2 always obtains the full value of any improvement in its
movies whether its movies are placed in the theater or not. As noted in Section 2, this may
encourage ineﬃcient investment decisions. D2 invests if doing so increases V
2e suﬃciently,
regardless of the eﬀect on V
all.
Now consider the opposite extreme: suppose D2’s ownership of EX allows it to obtain
D1’s entire marginal contribution. Expression (3.1) changes as follows:
W
1(new hit, new ﬂop, new ﬂop, new ﬂop)=0 (3.3)
W
2(new hit, new ﬂop, new ﬂop, new ﬂop)=V
all
Now D1 never invests, whereas D2 invests whenever doing so increases V
all suﬃciently.
Finally, suppose that the two players have equal bargaining power. Then they share D1’s
marginal contribution equally and expression (3.1) changes as follows:
W








12Several industry practitioners claim that integrated units attempt to operate at arm’s length (Friedberg
1992, Murphy 1992, Reardon 1992). While this is possible, it is still useful to examine the incentives
integration creates.
12W








1,2e is the value D1 gets if only D2’s movies are shown in the current period.
3.3. Demand
Before computing the model, demand must be described. The main fact driving strategic
delay in the movie industry is that if two new hits are released at the same time not all
consumers will see both of them. To incorporate this into the model, assume that some
fraction γ of consumers face time constraints each period and can see at most one movie.
Denote the movies in the theater by i and j. Each consumer wants to see movie i with
probability λi and movie j with probability λj. Assume that if a time constrained consumer
wants to see both movies he chooses each with probability 1
2. This implies that the probability








Expression (3.5) shows that hits steal more demand from other movies: if λj is higher then
movie i gets fewer customers. In the computations, I normalize monetary units so that the
number of consumers served by the theater multiplied by the ticket price is 1.G i v e nt h i s ,
the expected revenue of movie i is given by expression (3.5). The probability λi depends on
the movie’s type: For a new hit, λi = λh, for a new ﬂop, λi = λl, for an old hit, λi = αλh, for
an old ﬂop, λi = αλl, and for a ﬁnished movie, λi =0 ,w h e r eλh, λl, and α are parameters.
3.4. Parameterization
I use industry data to estimate the model’s parameters. The National Association of Theater
Owners (NATO) (1998) lists the domestic theatrical grosses for every movie released from
1985 to 1997 by the major studios: Buena Vista, Columbia, MGM/UA, New Line, Orion,
Paramount, Sony, TriStar, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, and Warner Brothers. There
are 2004 movies on the list. I deﬂate the grosses using the Consumer Price Index and deﬁne
a “hit” as a movie that achieved a gross of at least $50 million 1990 dollars. Using this
13deﬁnition, 15% of the movies are hits, which implies that p = .15.13 The average gross of
a hit is seven times the average gross of a ﬂop ($95.95 million vs. $13.68 million). In the
model’s equilibrium ﬂops leave the theater after one period while hits typically remain for
two. Thus, to approximately match the data, the ratio λh+αλh : λl should be seven to one.
Is e tλl = .1 (its scale does not matter), which implies that λh + αλh = .7.
To proceed further, I use weekly data on revenue per screen and the number of screens
each movie is showing on nationwide for a sample of 33 hits identiﬁed in the NATO data. The
source for this information is www.the-numbers.com. A typical contract period is either four,
six, or eight weeks in length. For each of these period lengths, I compute the percentage of
box oﬃce revenue earned in the second period on a per screen basis. Revenue in the second
period is approximately 30% of revenue in the ﬁrst period, which implies that α = .3.14
Given that λh +αλh = .7, this implies that λh = .54. The values of λh, λl, and α imply that
to maximize current revenue all new hits should be allocated, then old hits, then new ﬂops,
a n dt h e no l dﬂops.
The discount factor δ = .985. Given that a typical contract covers a six week period,
this discount factor implies an annual discount rate of 14%, which is reasonable in a high-
risk industry. The remaining parameters are the percentage of the population that is time
c o n s t r a i n e de a c hp e r i o dγ and the cost of replacing a movie early c. I lack data to estimate
these parameters. I set γ = .5, which implies that every period, half of the consumers are
time constrained.15 Because the welfare comparisons and predictions depend critically on
the values of c, I report results for diﬀerent levels of c. The algorithm used to compute the
value functions is described in Appendix B.
13This is consistent with De Vany and Walls (1996, 1999), who show that hits are rare: the distribution of
cumulative box oﬃce revenues is best-approximated by the Pareto distribution, which is skewed to the right.
The high cutoﬀ point ($50 milllion 1990 dollars) reﬂects the high cost of making and marketing movies.
The MPAA reports that in 2001 the average production and marketing costs of an MPAA member movie
exceeded $70 million.
14This is consistent with De Vany and Eckert (1991), De Vany and Walls (1996, 1999) and Sawhney and
Eliashberg (1996), who examine time series of ticket revenue: revenue per screen tends to fall over time.
15The MPAA reports that the average person in the U.S. and Canada age 12 and over sees 5.2 movies in a
theater per year. Further, 26% of consumers age 12 and over never go to the theater, 10% go less than once
in six months, 34% go at least once in six months, and only 30% go at least once a month. While this is not
direct evidence of time constraints, it shows that assuming that many of a theater’s potential customers see
at most one movie in any given six week period is reasonable.
143.5. General Characteristics of the Equilibrium
One result that appears to be robust to a wide range of parameter values and modeling
assumptions is that the monopoly setting (where one ﬁrm owns D1, D2, and EX) and the
non-integrated setting yield identical choices and welfare. Thus, non-integration is eﬃcient in
the sense of maximizing total ﬁrm value. Because these two settings yield identical outcomes,
I do not discuss monopoly in what follows.
A sa n t i c i p a t e di nS e c t i o n2 ,t h e r ea r en od i ﬀerences between vertical integration and
non-integration if c is suﬃciently high. At values of c in excess of .085 (roughly $11.5 million
1990 dollars) early replacements never occur and all settings are identical in all respects.
Distributors replace only ﬁnished movies. Equilibrium allocations maximize current revenue
except in two respects. First, distributors avoid head-to-head competition with new hits.
Second, new ﬂops may bump old hits from the theater. This latter strategy may be optimal
when no investment occurs because releasing a new ﬂop is the only way to eventually remove
it from inventory and obtain a chance of drawing a new hit. The rest of the discussion in
this paper concerns values of c that are below .085.
Tables 1-6 provide results for increasingly higher values of c.T h ev a l u e so fc approximate
1990 dollar amounts. Results are presented for two extreme values of c,$ 1 million and $8
million, and four intermediate values: $3 million, $4 million, $5 million, and $6 million. Each
table lists ﬁrm value and the present values of revenue and replacement costs for the state
where the players begin the allocation game with four new ﬂops. Considering other states
yields identical conclusions, so it is suﬃcient to examine this state. The tables also report
simulation results of 100,000 periods of play (the simulation is described in Appendix B).
There are several general characteristics of the equilibrium that hold across settings and
values of c. As in reality, hits have longer runs than ﬂops: old ﬂops are never shown in
the theater, while old hits often are. Also as in reality, distributors avoid head-to-head
competition with new hits. When two new hits are available, the release of one is typically
delayed. Delay allows the distributor to avoid a large adverse cross eﬀect on demand. One
hit can play out in the theater and then the other one can be released. The percentage of
periods in which at least one distributor delays releasing a new hit varies across settings and
15values of c.
The equilibrium contract terms aﬀect ﬁrm value and thus inﬂuence strategic decisions.
For example, in the non-integrated setting, taking D1’s inventory as given, D1’s value tends
to be higher, the lower the quality of D2’s movies. This follows from expression (3.1), which
shows that D1’s value is decreasing in the value D2 and EX can generate if only D2’s movies
are shown in the theater. Thus, D1 can increase its value by having hits, but its value
increases even more if it has hits while its competitor has ﬂops. Thus, delaying the release
of new hits until the other distributor has ﬂops is value-maximizing.
The payoﬀs from the marginal contribution equilibria roughly match those of real-world
exhibition contracts. Real-world exhibition contracts use non-linear revenue sharing rules;
distributors receive a higher share of revenue when revenue is high. The marginal contribu-
tion equilibria yield this pattern because hits are rare and the exhibitor’s next best alternative
is to show worse movies. For example, Table 7 compares allocation game payoﬀsf o rv a r i o u s
states in the non-integrated setting when c = .0365. The only diﬀerence between the ﬁrst
and second rows is that D1 has a new hit in the second row. Although EX’s payoﬀ rises
slightly, D1’s payoﬀ rises dramatically. Thus, D1 obtains the lion’s share of the marginal
value generated by its hit. The third row conﬁr m st h a tt h i sp a t t e r nh o l d sf o ro l dh i t sa s
well, and the fourth row shows that introducing a competing new hit does not change this
conclusion. Comparing the fourth row to the ﬁrst, each distributor’s value goes up by .36
but EX’s value goes up by only .16. The ﬁfth through seventh rows conﬁrm that similar
p a t t e r n sh o l dw h e nD 1 has two new hits, even if D2 also has one or more new hits.
3.6. Eﬀects of Vertical Integration
When c is low enough that investment occurs, some general conclusions hold for every value
of c. First, integration is always privately proﬁtable no matter what the impact on D1’s
bargaining power. Since the non-integrated setting produces the same industry value as
monopoly, integration cannot improve industry value; the best that can be achieved is no
change. Second, D2’s value is always higher when it appropriates more of D1’s marginal
contribution, and industry value is lowest in this case. This suggests that D2 will proﬁtably
appropriate D1’s contribution if it can, but doing so harms the industry.
16Additional results depend on how integration aﬀects investment and delay. In turn, the
eﬀects on investment and delay depend on how integration aﬀects D1’s bargaining power.
First, suppose D1 maintains its bargaining power after integration and continues to receive
its marginal contribution. In this case, integration causes D2 to increase its investment
and further delay releasing its hits. D2 replaces its ﬂops early and uses its hits as threats
to appropriate value from D1.I n r e s p o n s e , D 1 reduces its investment. However, industry
investment never falls, and if c is suﬃciently high, industry investment rises.
Consumer surplus rises if industry investment rises because more hits reach the theater.
As a result, integration may improve welfare. Suppose every consumer who sees a movie
receives some amount of surplus. Given this, total consumer surplus in any period is a
multiple of movie revenue in that period. The present value of consumer surplus at time t
is a multiple x of the present value of movie revenue, which can be computed as the value
functions are computed by taking into account the current allocation, possible future states,
future replacement decisions, and so on. Total welfare is higher under integration if
WN + xRN ≤ WI + xRI, (3.6)
where WN and RN are the combined value of all three ﬁrms and the present value of revenue,
respectively, for the non-integrated setting, and WI and RI are the corresponding values for
the integrated setting.
Expression (3.6) yields a critical percentage of the ticket price that consumers must obtain
as surplus in order for integration to be optimal. Tables 3-6 list these percentages. As c
falls, the welfare comparison becomes more favorable to integration. Each investment has a
lower cost and more investment occurs, so more hits reach the theater. For example, Table
3s h o w st h a tw h e nc = .0292 consumers need to receive only 3.5% of the ticket price as
surplus in order for integration to improve welfare. The MPAA reports that the average
price of admission in 2001 is $5.66. This implies an average willingness to pay that exceeds
the 2001 average price of admission by only 20 cents. Tables 1-2 show that as c falls further,
integration has no eﬀect on industry value or consumer surplus, and as a result is welfare
neutral, although it remains privately proﬁtable. High industry investment occurs under
17both non-integration and integration; the only eﬀect of integration is to redistribute value
from D1 to D2.
Now suppose D1 loses all of its bargaining power after integration and gives its entire
marginal contribution to D2. In this case, integration causes D1 to reduce its investment
to zero. D2 still increases its investment, but total investment falls. Fewer hits reach the
theater than in the non-integrated setting, and consumer surplus and welfare unambiguously
fall. In this case, the welfare-lowering eﬀect of integration occurs at all values of c.O t h e r
strategies also diﬀer. Less delay occurs relative to the non-integrated setting, partly because
fewer hits are generated, but also because D2 tends to show its own new hits instead of
delaying. D2 does not need to delay releasing its hits in order to appropriate value from D1.
D2 also has a greater tendency to bump old hits from the theater with D1’s new ﬂops in
order to generate more turnover from D1 (which yields more hits).
When D1 and D2 have equal bargaining power after integration, the welfare comparison
yields an intermediate case between the two extremes. As D2’s bargaining power after
the merger rises, the proﬁtability of merging rises, industry value falls, and the welfare
comparison becomes less favorable to integration. Results are presented for all cases except
c = .0585 (Table 6). As discussed in Subsection 3.7, the value functions did not converge in
this case. In a few other cases, the incentives created by equal bargaining power caused some
aspects of behavior to fall outside the bounds created by the two extremes. For example,
when c = .0439 (Table 5), the case with equal bargaining power involves D2 carrying new
hits in its inventory more than in the case where D1 has all of the bargaining power. The
eﬀect of this is that more delay occurs; the probability that new hits are shown in the theater
and the welfare eﬀects are still within those of the two extremes.
Whether the eﬀects described here occur in reality is an interesting question that is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth noting that when D2 owns EX it
is better able to manage investment, release dates, and run lengths to maximize the joint
value of the two operations, and De Vany and Eckert (1991) argue that this was a major
advantage of the studio system. However, the results show that maximizing the joint value
of the two operations does not necessarily maximize total welfare; the eﬀect of integration
on the bargaining power of independents must be considered.
183.7. Robustness
Several parameters that are constant here might diﬀer across settings. For example, if
integration generates more hits, consumers might lower their probability of attending each
one (reduce λh)a n dm a ya l s os e ef e w e rﬂops (reduce λl). The optimal ticket price might diﬀer
in the two settings. More generally, the exercise of holding other things equal and changing
the organizational form does not consider selection eﬀects. Distributors may choose which
exhibitors to buy on the basis of how consumers are likely to respond to the new setting,
how many competing exhibitors are in the area, and other factors.
However, if one is willing to assume that the parameters are constant across settings, the
results described above occur under a wide range of parameter values. Changing parameter
values produces intuitive eﬀects. Increasing p leads to less delay in releasing new hits, and
this is not surprising. The main incentive to delay is to avoid head-to-head competition with
another new hit, but if more new hits are likely to arrive soon then head-to-head competition
cannot be avoided by delaying. Increasing λh, decreasing λl, or increasing γ leads to more
delay because hits become more damaging to each other. Increasing α makes old hits more
valuable relative to new ﬂops, and it is less likely that they will be bumped from the theater.
The results are also robust to changing modeling assumptions. Footnotes 5, 7, and 11
mention some modiﬁed versions of the model that yield similar results. For example, in
a version referred to in footnote 11, the exhibitor can show only one movie if it chooses.
This version generates results identical to those in Tables 1-6 except in two cases. First,
in the non-integrated case when c = .0292 the value functions did not converge. I discuss
convergence further below. Second, in the non-integrated setting when c = .0585 some value
was redistributed from the distributors to EX without changing the total industry value or
anything else.
After computing several variations, some key ingredients appear necessary for generating
results like those presented above. First, there must be two ways for a ﬁrm to improve its
movie types: invest or wait and replace. Whether investments are replacements or other
types of investments does not matter. Second, in order for integration to make a diﬀer-
ence when D1 receives its marginal contribution, there must be some distinction between
19improving V
all and improving V
2e. Otherwise, D2’s investment choices do not change when
integration occurs, and the two cases are identical.
Old ﬂops are important for creating large diﬀerences between improving V
all and improv-
ing V
2e. To see why, suppose the state at the beginning of the replacement game is {new
hit, new ﬂop, new ﬂop, old ﬂop}, and compare replacing 2b with waiting. Suppose that if
no replacements are made, the equilibrium allocation is 1a (the new hit) with 1bo r2 a( a
new ﬂo p ) . N o wn o t et h a ti f2 bi sr e p l a c e dw i t han e wh i to rn e wﬂop, the allocation will
still be one new hit and one new ﬂop because distributors avoid head-to-head competition
with new hits. Thus, if the goal is improving V
all there is no point in investing today; it is
better to wait, save the expense of investing, and replace the ﬁnished movie the following
period (the same aggregate distribution of future movie types is achieved). However, if the
goal is improving V
2e then there is a gain to investing because 2b improves. Thus, D2 has
ag r e a t e ri n c e n t i v et oi n v e s tw h e ni to w n sE Xa n dD 1 receives its marginal contribution. In
general, D2’s investments almost always improve V
2e even when they do not improve V
all.
The eﬀects of integration when D2 receives D1’s marginal contribution are robust to
several modiﬁcations of the model. The eﬀects are mainly due to D1 h a v i n gn oi n c e n t i v et o
invest. Given this, D2 can show its own movies in preference to D1’s without aﬀecting any
of D1’s decisions. D2 also has the incentive to increase turnover from D1 by releasing D1’s
new ﬂops even when it has old hits it could show instead. This increases the probability that
D1 will obtain a hit, and all value from D1’s hits is appropriated by D2.
Although the results are robust to several modiﬁcations, the non-integrated setting and
the integrated case with equal bargaining power could not be computed at all parameter
values in all versions of the model. As noted in the previous subsection in the discussion
of integration with equal bargaining power when c = .0585,t h i si st r u eo ft h em a i nm o d e l
as well. As discussed in Appendix B, the computer algorithms are based on the common
technique for computing dynamic programming problems with single decision makers known
as “iterating on the value function.” Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) prove that this
process works under general conditions in problems with a single decision maker, but there
is no proof that this process works with multiple players. In practice, I have found that when
ﬁrms are close to being indiﬀerent between alternative strategies that diﬀer substantially, the
20value functions may cycle instead of converging. This does not pose a problem for reaching
conclusions from this class of models. Changing parameters slightly allows convergence to
occur in these marginal cases.
However, in some versions of the model convergence in the non-integrated setting occurs
only at extreme parameter values where investment occurs in very few states or in most
states. For example, when the exhibitor can threaten to show no movies in the allocation
game, the results in Tables 1 and 2 do not change, but value functions for the non-integrated
settings in the other tables do not converge. Thus, I cannot be sure how these threats would
aﬀect the equilibrium at intermediate levels of c. These threats do not aﬀect the optimal
allocation because they apply to all allocations, but they may aﬀect investment decisions
if they redistribute value from distributors to the exhibitor. Future work could attempt
to determine conditions under which iterating on the value function works in multi-player
settings. The existing literature that deals with numerically computing Markov perfect
equilibria is small and only begins to address this issue (Ericson and Pakes 1995, Pakes and
McGuire 1994, 2001, Gowrisankaran 1999).
4. Conclusion
This paper uses a dynamic common agency model with investment to explore the impact
of vertical integration on strategies and welfare in the movie industry. Contract terms
and investment interact with other strategic choices, the main one being the decision to
delay releasing new hits. Several general conclusions about the eﬀects of integration emerge.
First, non-integration yields the same strategies and welfare as monopoly. This implies that
integration cannot improve industry value. Second, the eﬀects of vertical integration depend
on how integration aﬀects investment. If investment does not change when integration occurs
then integration yields the same strategies and welfare as non-integration.
Third, the eﬀects of integration on investment depend critically on what happens to
the bargaining power of the independent distributor when integration occurs. In general,
when integration occurs the integrated distributor’s investment rises and the independent
distributor’s investment falls; the impact on total industry investment depends on which
21of these two eﬀects dominates. If the independent distributor retains its bargaining power
then industry investment never falls and may rise. If industry investment rises, the average
quality of movies shown in the theater rises. The resulting increase in consumer surplus may
cause total welfare to rise. If the independent distributor loses too much of its bargaining
power then it reduces its investment substantially, the average quality of movies shown in
the theater falls, and welfare unambiguously falls.
Other types of competition and contracting, such as block booking, production schedul-
ing, and contracting with talent, could be explored in future work.16 Before the Paramount
decrees, independent exhibitors complained about vertical integration in the movie indus-
try. Thus, adding additional exhibitors would be a useful step. Several other features of
the industry could also be included. For example, most theaters are now part of a large
chain. Although Paramount requires distributors to contract with each theater separately,
often boilerplate contracts are used that apply to every theater in a chain. The presence of
multiple chains could also be considered. Competition with additional exhibitors and chains
may allow one to endogenize the impact of integration on bargaining power.
This paper has focused on vertical relationships in the movie industry, but the model
could be adapted to examine how strategies and welfare implications diﬀer across industries
that have diﬀerent demand and supply conditions. The interactions between contract choice
and optimal investment, product introduction, and placement strategies could be studied in
further detail. Also, the model might be applied to analyze non-retail environments in which
multiple decision makers attempt to inﬂuence a third party over time.
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25Appendix A: Value Functions
The state is {new hit, new ﬂop, new ﬂop, new ﬂop} and the optimal allocation includes
1a and either 2a or 2b. The current period expected revenue is given by a function g(.,.)
whose arguments are the types of the two movies shown in the theater. Values are as follows:
V
all = g(new hit, new ﬂop)+δ[V
1(old hit, new ﬂop, old ﬂop, new ﬂop)+ (4.1)
V
2(old hit, new ﬂop, old ﬂop, new ﬂop)+V
e(old hit, new ﬂop, old ﬂop, new ﬂop)]
where δ is the discount factor and V 1,V 2, and V e are each player’s expected value of
beginning the following period at the given state.
V
1e considers only D1’s and EX’s value assuming that both of D1’s movies are allocated
to the theater. D1 has a new hit and a new ﬂop, so
V
1e = g(new hit, new ﬂop)+δ[V
1(old hit, old ﬂop, new ﬂop, new ﬂop) (4.2)
+V
e(old hit, old ﬂop, new ﬂop, new ﬂop)]
V
2e considers only D2’s and EX’s value assuming that both of D2’s movies are in the
theater. In this case, D2 has two new ﬂops, so
V
2e = g(new ﬂop, new ﬂop)+δ[V
2(new hit, new ﬂop, old ﬂop, old ﬂop) (4.3)
+V
e(new hit, new ﬂop, old ﬂop, old ﬂop)]
Finally, consider how V 1,V2 and V e are determined. They depend on the outcome of the
replacement game played at the beginning of the following period. For example, consider the
state we began the analysis with: {new hit, old ﬂop} {ﬁnished, new ﬂop}. If in equilibrium
D1 replaces 1b and D2 replaces 2a, then V i(new hit, old ﬂop, ﬁnished, new ﬂop)=W i
b,a,
i =1 ,2,e.
26Appendix B: The Computer Algorithm
The computer algorithm is based on the common technique for computing dynamic pro-
gramming problems with single decision makers known as “iterating on the value function”
(described by Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989). The procedure computes the value func-
tions of each player using an iterative process. Time to convergence is minimized by per-
forming as many calculations as possible before the iterations. First, specify the parameter
values and construct a grid of all possible states. Second, compute the single-period ex-
pected revenue for each possible allocation of movies to auditoriums at each state that is a
possible state of the allocation game. There are six possible allocations in each such state:
{1a2 a }{ 1a 1b} {1a 2b} {2a 1b} {2a 2b} {1b 2b}. Third, at each such state take each
possible allocation in turn and compute the state at the beginning of the next period given
the allocation. For example, if the state is {new hit, new ﬂop} {old hit, new ﬂop} and the
allocation is {2a, 1b}, then the future state is {new hit, old ﬂop} {ﬁnished, new ﬂop}. All
of this information is stored as part of the grid.
Fourth, for each state that is a possible state of the replacement game, compute all of
the possible future states that can occur given all of the possible replacement decisions that
can be made, along with the probabilities that each future state occurs. For example, if
the state is {new hit, old ﬂop} {ﬁnished, new ﬂop}, then the list of possible replacement
d e c i s i o n si ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1.I ft h eo l dﬂop and the ﬁnished movie are replaced, then the
right-hand sides of the three equations below Figure 1 show the four possible outcomes and
the probability that each occurs. All of this information is stored as part of the grid.
Each player has two value functions, one for its value in the replacement game and one
for its value in the allocation game. To initiate the iterations all of the value functions are set
equal to 0 at every state. At each iteration the algorithm takes the current value functions
as inputs, computes the equilibrium at every grid point, and uses the equilibrium payoﬀst o
compute new value functions. This process is repeated until the value functions no longer
change. The convergence criteria is that the maximum diﬀerence between the new and old
value functions of any player at any grid point in successive iterations must be less than
1e-10. Convergence takes 15-20 minutes using GAUSS version 5.0 on a Compaq Deskpro
w i t haP e n t i u mP r op r o c e s s o ra n d128 MB of RAM.
27An iteration involves two loops, one for the replacement game and one for the allocation
game. In the replacement game loop, starting at the ﬁrst grid point, the program uses each
player’s value function for the allocation game along with the probabilities and possible future
states computed in advance to compute each player’s expected value given every possible
replacement decision. Then, the equilibrium of the replacement game is computed, and the
equilibrium expected value that each player receives is stored as the value of the player if
the replacement game is played from the ﬁrst grid point. This procedure is repeated for
every grid point until each player’s value in the replacement game at every state has been
computed. Then the loop for the allocation game begins.
In the allocation game loop, starting at the ﬁrst grid point, the program uses the vectors
of movie revenues computed in advance, each player’s value function for the replacement
game, and the future states computed in advance to compute each player’s expected value
given every possible allocation. Then, the equilibrium of the allocation game is computed,
and the equilibrium expected value that each player receives is stored as the value of the
player if the allocation game is played from the ﬁrst grid point. This procedure is repeated
for every grid point until each player’s value in the allocation game has been computed.
Once the last state on the grid is completed the new value functions are complete and the
next iteration begins.
Once the value functions have converged, the equilibrium allocations are known for every
possible state in the allocation game, and the equilibrium replacement decisions are known for
every possible state in the replacement game. Given these decisions and the probabilities and
possible future states computed in advance, it is straightforward to begin at a particular state
and simulate an equilibrium path of play. Random numbers from the Uniform distribution
are used to resolve uncertainty. When there are multiple equilibria at a particular state (as
is often the case in the allocation game when some movies have the same type), each is
selected with equal probability.
28Figure 1. The Replacement Game when the state at the beginning of the period is
{new hit, old flop} {finished, new flop}
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Superscripts indicate the player and subscripts indicate which movies are replaced. As an
example, suppose D1 replaces 1b and D2 replaces 2a:
1 2 1
, W p W a b = (new hit, new hit, new hit, new flop)
1 ) 1 ( W p p − + (new hit, new hit, new flop, new flop)
1 ) 1 ( W p p − + (new hit, new flop, new hit, new flop)
1 2 ) 1 ( W p − + (new hit, new flop, new flop, new flop)
c −
2 2 2
, W p W a b = (new hit, new hit, new hit, new flop)
2 ) 1 ( W p p − + (new hit, new hit, new flop, new flop)
2 ) 1 ( W p p − + (new hit, new flop, new hit, new flop)
2 2 ) 1 ( W p − + (new hit, new flop, new flop, new flop)
e e
a b W p W
2
, = (new hit, new hit, new hit, new flop)
e W p p ) 1 ( − + (new hit, new hit, new flop, new flop)
e W p p ) 1 ( − + (new hit, new flop, new hit, new flop)
e W p
2 ) 1 ( − + (new hit, new flop, new flop, new flop)
The
1 W ,
2 W ,a n d
e W functions on the right-hand side of these three equations represent
the expected values of each player in the given states. For example,
1 W (new hit, new hit,
new hit, new flop) is Distributor 1’s expected value if two new hits are drawn. There are
four possible states because two movies are replaced, and each new movie can be a hit or









D2 has all of the
bargaining power
Allocation Game with Four New Flops
D1’s Value 6.85 6.84 3.38 0
D2’s Value 6.85
EX’s Value 13.45
Value of D2 and EX Combined 20.30 20.31 23.77 24.52
Value of All Firms Combined 27.16 27.16 27.16 24.52
Value of Revenue 28.55 28.55 28.55 25.29
Effect of Integration on Welfare No Effect No Effect Always Reduces
Welfare
Value of Replacement Costs 1.39 1.39 1.39 .78
Value of D1’s Replacement Costs .70 .70 .70 0
Value of D2’s Replacement Costs .70 .69 .70 .78
Simulation Results: Percentage of
Periods in which the Event Occurs
D1 has a New Hit 29 29 29 20
D2 has a New Hit 29 29 29 27
Delayed Release of a New Hit Occurs 11 11 11 7.3
D1 has a Delayed New Hit Release 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.9
D2 has a Delayed New Hit Release 5.8 5.9 5.8 1.8
At Least One New Hit is in the Theater 50 50 50 41
At Least One Old Hit is in the Theater 50 50 50 29









D2 has all of the
bargaining power
Allocation Game with Four New Flops
D1’s Value 5.52 5.48 2.61 0
D2’s Value 5.52
EX’s Value 13.33
Value of D2 and EX Combined 18.85 18.89 21.76 23.02
Value of All Firms Combined 24.37 24.37 24.36 23.02
Value of Revenue 28.53 28.53 28.49 25.19




Value of Replacement Costs 4.16 4.16 4.13 2.17
Value of D1’s Replacement Costs 2.08 2.08 2.05 0
Value of D2’s Replacement Costs 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.17
Simulation Results: Percentage of
Periods in which the Event Occurs
D1 has a New Hit 29 29 29 19
D2 has a New Hit 29 29 29 26
A Delayed Release of a New Hit
Occurs
12 12 12 6.7
D1 has a Delayed New Hit Release 6.3 6.3 6.1 5.1
D2 has a Delayed New Hit Release 6.2 6.2 6.2 1.7
At Least One New Hit is in the Theater 50 50 50 40
At Least One Old Hit is in the Theater 50 50 50 32









D2 has all of the
bargaining power
Allocation Game with Four New Flops
D1’s Value 4.87 4.82 2.23 0
D2’s Value 4.87
EX’s Value 13.25
Value of D2 and EX Combined 18.12 18.17 20.76 22.31
Value of All Firms Combined 22.99 22.99 22.99 22.31
Value of Revenue 28.36 28.40 28.40 25.07
Effect of Integration on Welfare (Percentage of the
Ticket Price Consumers Must Receive as Surplus







Value of Replacement Costs 5.38 5.41 5.41 2.77
Value of D1’s Replacement Costs 2.69 2.63 2.63 0
Value of D2’s Replacement Costs 2.69 2.78 2.78 2.77
Simulation Results: Percentage of Periods in which
the Event Occurs
D1 has a New Hit 29 29 29 19
D2 has a New Hit 29 29 29 25
A Delayed Release of a New Hit Occurs 11 11 11 6.3
D1 has a Delayed New Hit Release 5.8 5.7 5.7 4.8
D2 has a Delayed New Hit Release 5.8 6.0 6.0 1.5
At Least One New Hit is in the Theater 50 50 50 40
At Least One Old Hit is in the Theater 50 50 50 32









D2 has all of the
bargaining power
Allocation Game with Four New Flops
D1’s Value 7.96 4.40 2.07 0
D2’s Value 7.96
EX’s Value 6.08
Value of D2 and EX Combined 14.04 17.46 19.53 21.81
Value of All Firms Combined 22.00 21.85 21.60 21.81
Value of Revenue 23.57 25.85 25.14 23.04
Effect of Integration on Welfare (Percentage of the
Ticket Price Consumers Must Receive as Surplus







Value of Replacement Costs 1.57 4.00 3.55 1.23
Value of D1’s Replacement Costs .79 .50 0 0
Value of D2’s Replacement Costs .79 3.50 3.55 1.23
Simulation Results: Percentage of Periods in which
the Event Occurs
D1 has a New Hit 19 19 19 17
D2 has a New Hit 19 28 26 19
A Delayed Release of a New Hit Occurs 3.6 7.4 6.7 2.9
D1 has a Delayed New Hit Release 1.9 2.9 5.2 2.4
D2 has a Delayed New Hit Release 1.8 4.6 1.5 .58
At Least One New Hit is in the Theater 34 42 40 32
At Least One Old Hit is in the Theater 34 42 32 27









D2 has all of the
bargaining power
Allocation Game with Four New Flops
D1’s Value 7.69 4.32 2.10 0
D2’s Value 7.69
EX’s Value 6.31
Value of D2 and EX Combined 14.00 16.74 18.84 21.57
Value of All Firms Combined 21.68 21.06 20.94 21.57
Value of Revenue 23.57 25.83 24.79 23.04
Effect of Integration on Welfare (Percentage of the
Ticket Price Consumers Must Receive as Surplus







Value of Replacement Costs 1.89 4.77 3.85 1.47
Value of D1’s Replacement Costs .94 .58 0 0
Value of D2’s Replacement Costs .94 4.20 3.85 1.47
Simulation Results: Percentage of Periods in which
the Event Occurs
D1 has a New Hit 18 19 18 17
D2 has a New Hit 19 28 36 19
A Delayed Release of a New Hit Occurs 3.7 7.4 19 2.9
D1 has a Delayed New Hit Release 1.9 2.9 3.4 2.4
D2 has a Delayed New Hit Release 1.9 4.6 15 .55
At Least One New Hit is in the Theater 34 42 38 32
At Least One Old Hit is in the Theater 34 42 37 27
A New Flop Bumps an Old Hit 0 0 .49 4.9Table 6. The Non-Integrated and Integrated Settings: c = .0585 ($8 million 1990 dollars)
Non-
Integrated
Integrated: D1 has all of
the bargaining power
Integrated: D2 has all of
the bargaining power
Allocation Game with Four New Flops
D1’s Value 7.32 4.40 0
D2’s Value 7.32
EX’s Value 6.48
Value of D2 and EX Combined 13.80 15.31 21.11
Value of All Firms Combined 21.11 19.71 21.11
Value of Revenue 22.83 24.61 22.70
Effect of Integration on Welfare (Percentage of the Ticket






Value of Replacement Costs 1.72 4.89 1.59
Value of D1’s Replacement Costs .86 .16 0
Value of D2’s Replacement Costs .86 4.74 1.59
Simulation Results: Percentage of Periods in which the
Event Occurs
D1 has a New Hit 17 15 15
D2 has a New Hit 17 40 20
A Delayed Release of a New Hit Occurs 2.5 21 2.4
D1 has a Delayed New Hit Release 1.2 .14 .024
D2 has a Delayed New Hit Release 1.3 21 2.4
At Least One New Hit is in the Theater 32 37 32
At Least One Old Hit is in the Theater 22 36 22
A New Flop Bumps an Old Hit 9.8 .97 10Table 7. Equilibrium Values for Selected States in the Non-Integrated Setting: c = .0365 ($5 million 1990
dollars)
The State at the Beginning of the Allocation Game D1’s Value D2’s Value EX’s Value
{new flop, new flop}{new flop, new flop} 7.96 7.96 6.08
{new hit, new flop} {new flop, new flop} 8.45 7.90 6.11
{old hit, new flop} {new flop, new flop} 8.05 7.95 6.09
{new hit, new flop} {new hit, new flop} 8.32 8.32 6.24
{new hit, new hit} {new flop, new flop} 8.83 7.87 6.17
{new hit, new hit} {new hit, new flop} 8.67 8.25 6.33
{new hit, new hit} {new hit, new hit} 8.55 8.55 6.46